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ON LABOUR MARKET THEORIES
I - INTRODUCTION
The relation between the concept of the labour market and the 
Phillips curve has experienced some contradictory moments in the 
history of the theoretical debate on the determination of wages. 
The Phillips curve is one of the most popular examples in 
Economics of how an empirical finding, such as the negative 
correlation between inflation and unemployment, can rapidly gain a 
great success and be included in macroeconometric models without 
having a well developed theory to support it. As a result, in 
fact, this success offuscated the notion of the labour market and 
led to the standard practice in macroeconometric models of 
relegating the determination of wages to a wage-price block.
With the increasing instability of the empirical trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment [1]/ a decade after its 
"discovery" in the late 50's (Phillips 1958, Lipsey 1960), a 
substantial effort in the direction of the construction of its 
theoretical foundations was made. The coexistence of an




























































































unemployment was becoming a lasting feature in the economic scene 
which stimulated the reformulation of the Phillips relation. The 
idea was to take into account the workers' concern about real 
wages by means of the introduction of inflationary expectations 
and explain why the Phillips curve could shift over time, thus 
determining an equilibrium rate of unemployment , the 'natural 
rate', which was consistent with an infinity of inflation rates.
The late 60's, therefore, marked a revival of interest in the 
labour market and the joint determination of employment and wages, 
in conjunction with the development of the microeconomic 
foundations of the Phillips curve (Phelps 1967,1970). In the '70s 
and 80's the literature on the microeconomic foundations of the 
Phillips curve reaffirmed, even more strongly, the labour market 
concept.
In very synthetic terms, two basic approaches can be identified 
in the recent literature of the labour market:
1) the competitive approach, which views the determination of 
wages as the outcome of the confrontation of the choices of firms 
and workers who act on an individual basis (in accordance with the 
concepts of the representative firm and worker);
2) the non-competitive approach, according to which the individual




























































































to form coalitions with the other workers before facing the firm 
(e.g. Trade Unions and Implicit Contract theories [2]).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the differences and 
similarities in the initial assumptions and final predictions of 
the two approaches. In particular, I focus on trade unions' 
models, my aim being to show what are their implications about the 
characteristics of unemployment (voluntary or involuntary) and 
wages (flexible or rigid) they predict as compared to competitive 
models.
In section II, I discuss briefly Lucas' microfoundations of the 
Phillips curve as a representative example of competitive models 
that assume market clearing. I then give a brief account of 
"efficiency wage" models that, retaining the competition 
assumption, show why market clearing is not achieved. In section 
III I deal with the non-competitive approach to the labour 
market and then focus on trade unions models. I treat the two 
cases where the level of wages may be set either unilaterally by 
unions ('monopoly wage' models), or by means of a bargaining 
process over wages and employment between firms and unions 
(efficient bargaining models). Some concluding observations are




























































































II - COMPETITIVE MODELS OF THE LABOUR MARKET
II.I. Lucas microfoundations of the Phillips curve.
Lucas' justification for the Phillips curve is derived from the 
interconnection of the concepts of the worker's intertemporal 
substitution between leisure and consumption (Lucas and Rapping 
1969) and misperception of aggregate shocks (Lucas 1973, 1975). 
In Lucas-Rapping model the following worker's labour supply 
function (in logs) is derived from utility maximization [3]:
V  V"-p>t- W r ct> - a3(pt+r  v rj
where w is the nominal wage, p is the price level, r the nominal 
interest rate and * 2 ,a3 measure the intertemporal substitution
effects between working more now (in the future) and consuming 
more in the future (now). This relation gives a 'micro' motivation 
for the Phillips curve: an unexpected increase in ŵ_ and p̂ _, say,
given rfc rises L^ ( since w®+^and P^+1 are given) by a2+ a^> 0.
Intuitively, this means that an unexpected increase in current 
inflation following an expansionary manoeuvre decreases




























































































more labour. If this relation could be embedded in a general 
equilibrium model with imperfect information, we would have a 
theoretical confirmation of Friedman's message that the Phillips 
trade-off holds only after unanticipated aggregate shocks (which 
may be the result of economic policy decisions) because of 
temporary money illusion effects which prevent the workers from 
realizing that their real wage has actually changed.
Bull and Frydman (1983) have shown that this unification of 
intertemporal substitution and misperception in a general 
equilibrium model is indeed possible. They derive Lucas' Phillips 
curve by integrating this micro-model of labour supply in Lucas' 
"island parable" according to which the economic agents can 
observe the local conditions of production but can only predict 
the current values of aggregate variables. That means that the 
labour demand in each micro-market is known with certainty, since 
it depends on the observable product wage. The labour supply is 
instead subject to uncertainty because the workers base their 
labour supply'decisions on the consumption wage, which is a random 
variable since it involves the prediction of the aggregate 
consumption price (the workers are assumed to consume also other 
goods which are not produced on their 'island').
Hence, integrating Lucas-Rapping model in Lucas' rational 




























































































misperception of aggregate shock and market-clearing in both the 
labour and the product markets, Lucas' aggregate supply curve is 
obtained, whereby changes in output are a consequence of 
expectational errors following an unexpected shock in aggregate 
demand. The expectations-augmented Phillips relation is naturally 
derived inverting this supply function.
This approach is theoretically perfect in that it supplies 
complete microfoundations to the Phillips curve from the 
qualitative point of view. It suffers, however, from, the heavy 
drawback that it is not confirmed by evidence. In other words, the 
concept of the worker who decides how much labour to supply today 
on the basis of his wage and price expectations for tomorrow and 
on the level of the rate of interest is not confirmed by the data 
(Altonji 1982, Ashenfelter and Card 1982, Andrews and Nickell 
1982)[4].
This criticism goes pari passu with the observation that in 
this model’, the labour demand is fixed and it is the labour supply 
which has the task of reequilibrating the labour market after an 
unexpected policy shock, because the introduction of uncertainty 
about the level of consumption wages makes it shift along the 
demand curve. This mechanism rules out the existence of




























































































the most challenging and real problems economic theory is 
confronted with.
II.II. Alternative theories of the competitive labour market: the 
"efficiency wage" hypothesis.
Since one of the main qualities of an economic theory is to fit 
the stylized facts, it seems quite extraordinary that a lot of 
energies have been devoted to convince the economic profession 
that unemployment is essentially voluntary, that is, market 
clearing always occurs. In fact, even if imperfect information is 
introduced in that framework, such as in Lucas' theory, it is hard 
to believe that a worker is involuntarily unemployed because if he 
"knew" more about the conditions of production he would not choose 
to remain idle.
There is a field of research, however,- that retaining the
competition assumption has made some progress towards the
explana’t ion of involuntary unemployment. These theor ies are
founded on the "efficiency wage" hypothesis whereby wages are 
fixed unilaterally by firms.
The "efficiency wage" hypothesis is concerned with the 
explanation of why firms find it unprofitable to cut wages in the 




























































































is that the single worker's productivity is closely related to the 
wage he earns in such a way that the firm may choose to retain a 
wage that is above the market clearing level, on the grounds that, 
by lowering it, it would reduce the average productivity of its 
workers and, by consequence, raise labour costs. Unemployment is 
involuntary because the unemployed worker keeps offering his 
labour, trying without any success to underbid his employed 
rivals. The equilibrium wage lies on the profit maximizing labour 
demand curve, but persistently above the labour supply.
1) the quitting models. Because quitting imposes costs on firms, 
employers have an incentive to discourage it by rising wages.[6]
2) The shirking model. It is based on the hypothesis of imperfect 
information about the workers' "on the job" behaviour:
In the competitive paradigm, in which all 
workers receive the market wage and there is no 
unemployment, the worst that can happen to a 
worker who shirks on the job is that he is fired.
Since he can immediately be rehired ( because of 
full employment) he pays no penalty for this 
misbehaviour. With imperfect monitoring and full 
employment the worker will choose to shirk. To 
induce its workers not to shirk the firm attempts 
to pay more than the 'going wage'. Then if a 
worker is caught shirking he will pay a penalty.
If it pays one firm to raise its wage, it will pay 
all firms to raise their wages. When they all 
raise their wages the incentive not to shirk again 
disappears. But as all firms raise their wages 
their demand for labour decreases and unemployment 
results. With unemployment, even if all firms pay 
the same wage a worker has an incentive not to 
shirk. For, if he is fired, he won't obtain 




























































































must be sufficiently large that it pays workers to 
work rather than take the risk of being caught 
shirking." (Shapiro and Stiglitz,1984,p.433)
3) The adverse selection model. It is based on the assumption of 
imperfect information about the intrinsic productivity of each 
worker. If workers differ because of the degree of their ability 
they are likely to have different reservation wages. The firm, in 
order to screen itself from bad workers, will choose the policy of 
offering higher than average wages so as to attract more able job 
candidates (Weiss, 1980).
4) The gift exchange model. It is a sociologically oriented 
explanation of the occurrence of higher wages based on the 
concepts of loyalty of the firm towards the group of its most 
capable and faithful workers in the form of higher pay in exchange 
of higher quality of labour services (Akerlof,1982).
These models, therefore, are concerned with involuntary 
unemployment. Although no explicit macromodel exists, the 
explanation of the rise in unemployment in the 70's one can draw 
from them is that firms, given their concern for attracting good 
workers and for keeping their morale high, did not reduce real 





























































































This theory of wage determination is indeed suggestive and 
especially useful at a micro level. Its implications at a macro 
level might raise some doubts, given the recent exceptional 
increase in the unemployment rates occurred in many European 
countries at least. One of the major criticisms which is raised, 
in fact, is that in these countries it is seldom observed that 
firms set wages unilaterally, collective bargaining being the 
basic determinant of wages (7).
Ill - NON-COMPETITIVE MODELS OF THE LABOUR MARKET: THE BARGAINING 
THEORY OF THE LABOUR MARKET
The role of unions in the labour market is not a new topic in 
economic theory. The interest in this issue dates back at least to 
the mid '40s with the works of Dunlop (1944), Leontief (1946) and 
Ross (1948). In these studies unions start to be seen as entities 
with a well defined set of preferences, the real counterpart of 
firms. Since then, the subject has been more or less ignored until 
quite recently. With the increasing difficulty in explaining the 
economic performance of the Western countries, economists have 
realized that such important economic subjects as unions could no 
longer be ignored . In the late '70s and in the '80s, therefore,




























































































theory of trade unions has taken place [8]. This theory turned 
out, last but not least, to serve as a new microfoundation for the 
Phillips curve. A lot of work, however, remains to be done on the 
empirical side. The econometric literature has just started to 
emerge and it seems that, until now, there has not been a lot of 
progress on this ground [9],
In its most general terms, the theory of trade union 
behaviour is concerned with the effects on wages and employment of 
bargaining between the firm and its unionized members. The firm is 
assumed to have a utility function over profits and the union over 
wages and employment [10]. Depending on the bargaining rule we can 
consider three cases:
1) the firm sets employment and the union sets the wage (monopoly 
union model);
2) the firm sets employment and then both the union and the firm 
bargain over the wage ( the'right to manage'model);
3) the firm and the union bargain over both the wage and 
employment (the 'efficient bargaining'model).
The obvious theoretical tool for the analysis of the interplay 
between two parties is to be found in game theory. The most 
popular formal solution to a bargaining problem is Nash's. 
According to his result, the function to be maximized is the




























































































Appendix I). The Nash solution is the best suited to derive the 
equilibrium wage and employment of the three types of bargaining 
problems we have mentioned above.
We obtain the three models as special cases of a general 
specification of the Nash solution :
(1) max [V (T(w,L)) - V(m]b [U (w,L) - U ]
where L is employment, w is the real wage, V and U are the utility 
functions of the firm and the union respectively; # are profits
and 7 C  and U are the fall-back levels of profits and unions utility 
if no bargaining takes place; b is a parameter. The two 
differences represent the firm's and union's gain over the non­
bargaining outcome.
The maximization of (1) with respect to L and w yields the 
efficient bargaining solution. Assuming L to be the labour demand 
function, that is L=L(w), the maximization of (1) with respect to 
w yields the 'right to manage'model. Assuming L=L(w), b=0 and 
maximizing (1) with respect to w we get the monopoly union 
outcome.




























































































III.I. The efficient bargaining model.
In this model (McDonald and Solow, 1981) the firm and the union 
bargain over both the wage and the employment levels. The 
equilibrium value of employment L* and real wage w* are found 
making use of Nash's solution, that is solving the maximization 
problem (1).
For simplicity, let's assume that:
(2) V (T) “V  = R (L) - w L
where R is the revenue function and R'(L)>0, R"(L)<0 ;if no 
bargaining takes place the firm does not employ any worker and has 
no revenue:
(3) 1f = 0 , V <0)=0;
the workers are all identical and the union's utility is the same 
as the sum of their individual utilities:
(4) U ( w , L ) = L u ( w )  and U = L u
where u is the worker's utility function; tt is the worker's fall­




























































































determined by employment benefits and/or by an alternative wage 
but, for the moment we write:
(5) u = u ( w )
where w represent any alternative wage.
Given these assumptions, the maximization problem (1) can be 
rewritten as:
(6) max [ R( L ) - w L ]  [ u(w) -u(w) ] L
L,w
Maximizing with respect to L yields:
(7) R'(L) - 2 w L + R(L) = 0 
so that the real wage is given by:
(8) w = (1/2)[ R(L)/L + R '(L)]
Hence w is a decreasing function of L because of the form of 
the revenue function.




























































































(9) L [ u(w ) - u(w )]/ u'(w) = -R'(L)L + 2 w L - w L
substituting R(L)= - R'(L)L + 2wL from (7) in the r.h.s. of (9)
we get:
(10) [u(w)-u(w)]/ u'(w) = w - R '(L)
(10) yields the so called "contract curve" which is upward 
sloping in the L,w plane.
The intersection of (8) and (10) gives the Nash equilibrium 
solution L* and w*.
The economic intuition behind this analytical solution is as 
follows.
The firm is a profit maximizer and it is indifferent between 
the combination of employment and wages that leave its level of 




























































































(11) R( L ) - w L = C
There are an infinite number of these isoprofit curves (see 
fig.l) and the lowest denotes the highest level of profits, since 
for any given L a lower w means higher profits. The firm's demand 































































































The union has M identical members; L of them are employed by 
the firm. The expected utility of a union member is;
(12) e(u)=(L/M) u(w) + [ (M - L)/M ] u(w)
The union is indifferent between different combinations of w,L
which leave the total gain in utility from employment constant,
i .e. ;
(13) L ( u(w) - u(w) ) = g
Graphically, the equilibrium values L* and w* are given by the 
tangency points of the firm's isoprofit curves and the union's 
indifference curves. Their locus defines the "contract curve". 
Finding the slopes of (11) and (13) in the L,w plane and
equating them we get;
(14) u(w) - u(w) _ w - R (L)
u (w) L L
equal to (10) which we derived using the Nash bargaining function.
Another interesting iterpretation of this result is that the 




























































































(15) p u(w) + (1-p) u(w)
where p=L/M is the probability of being employed by the firm, 
equates at equilibrium, the marginal utility of one unit more of 
income multiplied by the probability of being employed with the 
marginal loss derived from the increased probability of not 
finding a job given his new request.
In formulae this is:
(16) ÉiìlEldw u(w) u (w) du ( w) ^ dw
and:
(IV) d(l=p) = _ dp
dw dw
(16) implies again the Nash solution since substituting p=L/M 
in it we get:
(18) u(w) - u(w) 1 dw
u (w) L dL
where dw/dL is the slope of the isoprofit curve which then yields




























































































If such contracts are enforced in the labour market, the 
employer will, in all probability, be off his labour demand curve. 
In fact, the contract curve coincides with the labour demand curve
at w only, which can be interpreted as the competitive level of 
the real wage. Otherwise, at any other equilibrium point, the wage 
is higher than the marginal productivity of labour. The efficiency 
of the contract lies in the fact that both the firm and the union 
are better off if they choose an agreement on the contract curve 
than in any other region of the L,w plane (Pareto optimality is 
achieved) [13]. Here, as in many models that attempt to explain 
wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment, it is assumed that a 
perfect insurance market does not exist. If it existed, workers 
could go and insure themselves against the fluctuations in their 
income. Here, instead, workers look for an indirect way to 
overcome this market imperfection. From this observation Oswald 
(1985) draws the intuition as to why a Pareto-optimal wage bargain 
is likely to increase employment rather than reduce it:
"In an ideal world each union member 
would like to purchase full insurance - that 
is , insurance which equates his or her 
marginal utility of income across all states 
of nature - against the risk of 
unemployment. That possibility is assumed 
away here: an unemployed person receives 
only government benefit, b. There is a way 
to achieve insurance indirectly, however, 
because the union can reduce the risk of any 
individual being laid off. Hence it sets 
employment above the level which it would 
desire if insurance markets were perfect 




























































































Overemployment is rational? it is the 
optimal way to reduce risk at the expense of 
technical efficiency."
The question concerning which point on the contract curve will 
be chosen is merely a matter of power: higher levels of wages and 
employment will be the signal of a more powerful union, whereas a 
more profitable firm is behind lower levels of both these 
variables. To derive a unique solution we therefore need a rule 
determining the distribution of revenue between the employer and 
the workers- In our Nash solution this sort of "equity locus", as 
McDonald and Solow (1981) call it, is given by (8), which states 
that the real wage is equal to the mean of the average and 
marginal revenue product of labour.
Once the formal structure of the efficient bargaining model is 
set up, it is possible to see how the equity locus and the 
contract curve shift with aggregate demand changes. If these 
changes cause the two loci to shift in an offsetting fashion it is 
possible to explain the stylized fact of wage rigidity and 
employment fluctuations over the business cycle.




























































































III.II The right to manage model and the monopoly union model.
We consider now the case of the firm setting employment 




(20) L* = L*(w)
In the right to manage model the firm sets employment and 
bargains over wages with the union ( Nickell and Andrews, 1983). 
Although this model has the appealing property of being more 
realistic than the other two, it yields the same predictions of 
the monopoly model: the explanatory variables of the wage level 
and their predicted sign are identical. On this issue there are 
some problems which have not been settled yet.
For simplicity, we shall concentrate on the monopoly model 
which will be the basis of our empirical specification.
Using the same simplifications of section 4.4.1, the
equilibrium combination of wages and employment is given by the 
tangency point of the labour demand curve with the union's 
indifference curve (see fig.2 ).




























































































(21) R'(L) - w = 0 
The solution is therefore:
(22) u(w) - u(w) _ L R"(L)
u (w) w w
(22) says that the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
employment with respect to wages is equal to the wage 
of demand for labour taken positively.
Fig. 2






























































































IV - CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.
It is now time to ask if the above trade unions models supply a
valid alternative to competitive models for the explanation of the 
existence of involuntary unemployment and wage rigidity.
The models where the firm sets employment say that the 
equilibrium wage is on the labour demand curve, but above the 
competitive level, because of the action of the union which exerts 
some of its monopoly power. Wage rigidity with respect to demand 
changes arises only if specific assumptions on the structural form 
of the labour demand function are made, such that the wage 
elasticity of demand in (22) is constant.
The efficient bargaining model , as we have seen, predicts 
overemployment, thus failing to give an answer to one of the two 
crucial issues. Wage rigidity, as in the monopoly union models, 
arises only if specific parameters are chosen such that the 
contract curve and the equity locus shift in an offsetting way 
after demand shocks.
As far as the bargaining set up of the efficient bargaining 
model is concerned, the criticism that is usually raised about 
this model is that it is not clear if, in reality, unions bargain 




























































































survey data which yield contradictory results for Britain [14]. 
Andrews and Nickell (1983, p.509) say on this point:
Since the previous model [the monopoly 
model] does not have this rather appealing 
property [ Pareto efficiency], it is worth 
considering why firms might wish to impose 
the negotiating rule that they will only talk 
about wages when the outcome is such that 
futher discussion about employment could 
yield higher profits without impairing the 
union's welfare. One powerful argument is 
that, as we have already noted, firms find it 
desirable to make continuous adjustment to 
their total level of employment. They would 
presumably find the idea of continual 
negotiation on this issue, with possible 
discussion on wages thrown in, as simply too 
costly an interference with their managerial 
function."
And also (p. 510):
This model has the strong implication that a 
rise in union power will raise employment.
Since we know of no evidence either in our 
results or elsewhere, to support this 
contention, this is an additional reason for 
not pursuing this particular model any 
further."
The monopoly union model, on the other hand, has the 
unrealistic feature that unions set the wage without having to 
negotiate with firms.
It must be added that there are some special cases in which 
efficient bargains and monopoly equilibria are identical, that is 




























































































the union's indifference curve has some flat segments and it 
touches the firm's isoprofit curve there. In this case the 
contract curve and the labour demand curve coincide (fig.3)
Fig. 3
w
When is the union's indifference curve flat?
One possible explanation might be given using the "seniority " 
model (Grossmann 1983). This model is based on the assumption that 
lay-offs follow a "last in first out" rule and that the union 
takes its decisions according to a majority rule. Hence, if the 
majority of its members are senior workers in the firm and they 




























































































of the union will be flat starting from the median seniority 
voter.
Once account is taken of the institutional setting of the 
specific sector or industry under study, the last word about the 
superiority of one model over the other is left to econometric 
testing. Some econometric studies about specific industries or 
sectors are already available [15]. What seems to be quite a 
difficult task, is to construct a statistical test that would 
allow to reject either the efficient bargaining model or the 
monopoly union model. Ashenfelter and Brown (1985) and Card (1985) 
use the following method. Since wage and employment in the 
efficient bargaining model are jointly determined, all the 
variables determining wages should influence employment and 
viceversa. In the monopoly union model, instead, the wage is 
chosen given the level of employment. If empirically, it turns out 
that employment is not affected by the variables determining 
wages, then one might not reject the hypothesis of a monopoly 
union framework. These are only preliminary results, however, and





























































































Let's assume that the bargaining set B , that is the set of 
pairs of firm's and union's utilities ( v and u respectively), is 
closed, bounded and convex.
Let's represent it in the v,u plane [26].
Suppose that the point (u*,v*)€ B is the payoff of the union
and firm when no bargaining takes place. Of course, the firm would




























































































incompatible. Any bargaining point in the shaded area, however, 
would be preferred by both to the point (u*,v*) and considered a 
fair outcome.
Nash shows that if we displace the origins of the axis so that 
(u*,v*)e B=(0,0) 6 B' and chose (uq 'vq ) in such a way that:
a) (u', v' )6 B* and u*, v' > 0?o o o o
b) u'v'> uv for all (u,v) 6 B',o o-
then the point (u', v' ) is the solution to the bargaining game in o o
B' .
Since u'= u - u*, and v' = v - v* where (v , u )? B we get that: o- o o o o o
(Al) (u - u*)(v - v*)>(u - u*)(v - v*)o o -
for all u,v e B and such that u> u*, v> v*.
This functional form is the only one which satisfies the 
following four axioms required for a bargaining solution:
1) invariance w.r.t. utility transformations?
2) Pareto optimality;
3) independence of irrelevant alternatives?
4) symmetry [27].
There are many objections to the axioms that underly the Nash 
solution but, as far as we know, solutions based on more 
satisfactory axioms have led to complicated arithmetic solutions 




























































































1 This fact has been well documented for the U.S. by R. J. Gordon 
(1970,1971/1977).
2 The theory of implicit contracts must be included among the 
present most popular theories of the labour market. See the 
seminal papers by Azariadis (1975) and Hart (1983).
3 This result is obtained from the maximization of an 
individual's two-period utility function of consumption and 
leisure subject to his two-period budget constraint.
4 Until recently, econometricians have not paid much attention to 
the intertemporal substitution hypothesis despite its 
theoretical importance. Solow (1980, p.7) literally attacks its 
believers:
"It is astonishing that believers have 
made substantially no effort to verify this 
central hypothesis. I know of no convincing 
evidence in its favour, and I am not sure 
why it has any claim to be taken seriously."
Altonji (1982) provides a careful investigation of whether 
the intertemporal substitution model can explain the annual 
time series data for the U.S. His results, and much other 
evidence he cites, raise serious doubts about the empirical 
viability of the intertemporal substitution-market equilibrium 
view of the labour market. Ashenfelter and Card(1982) estimate 
a simplified model with intertemporal substitution but their 
results as well confirm the incapability of this assumption to 
explain the U.S. labour market in the years 1956:1-1980:1. 
Andrews and Nickell (1982) estimate a competitive model for the 
U.K.(1948-1979) and contrast its results with those of a non­
competitive one. They draw the conclusion that the competitive 
model does not fit the facts.
5 For an excellent survey of this literature see Yellen (1984).
6 See e.g. Calvo(1979), Salop (1979), Stiglitz (1974).
7 The efficiency wage hypothesis, anyway, might prove to be 
useful for explaining other important components of the 




























































































8 See the majority of Oswald's papers, and in particular Oswsld 
1979, 1982, 1985).
9 See the survey papers by Farber (1985) and Pencavel (1985).
10 There is a vast literature concerning the choice of the union's 
utility function. In recent contributions to this issue two 
main streams may be identified :
1) studies that make use of an expected utility or utilitarian 
function (e.g. McDonald and Solow, 1981);
2) studies which assume a specific structural form to replace 
the general quasi-concave utility function (e.g. Pencavel, 
1984a,b who chooses a Stone-Geary utility function).
See on this point Oswald (1985).
11 The isoprofit curves are given by the implicit derivation of 
( 11) :
(11a) dw/dL = [R'(L) - w]/L
Their maxima are given equating (11a) to zero so that:
(lib) R'(L) = w
which is the labour demand equation.
12 Sutton (1985) shows how any Nash equilibrium of a wide range of 
non-cooperative games will, in the limit, coincide with the 
Nash bargaining solution.
13 The idea that the union and the firm are better off above and 
to the right of the labour demand curve is originally due to 
Leontief (1946)
14 See for the British economy e.g. Oswald and Turnbull (1985) for 
evidence against this hypothesis, and Daniel and Millward 
(1983) for evidence in favour.
15 See e.g. Carruth and Oswald (1985), who focus on the British 
post war coal sector and the role of the National Union of Mine 
workers; MaCurdy and Pencavel (1985) focus on data on U.S. 
typographical unions.
16 This short exposition of Nash's solution follows Luce and 
Raiffa (1957), pp.124-28.
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